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Abstract
Humans handle uncertainty poorly. Prospect theory accounts for this with a value function in which possible losses are
overweighted compared to possible gains, and the marginal utility of rewards decreases with size. fMRI studies have
explored the neural basis of this value function. A separate body of research claims that prediction errors are calculated
by midbrain dopamine neurons. We investigated whether the prospect theoretic effects shown in behavioral and fMRI
studies were present in midbrain prediction error coding by using the feedback-related negativity, an ERP component
believed to reflect midbrain prediction errors. Participants’ stated satisfaction with outcomes followed prospect theory but
their feedback-related negativity did not, instead showing no effect of marginal utility and greater sensitivity to potential
gains than losses.
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Making effective decisions under choice requires people to con-
struct mental representations of value. When goods on offer will be
received with a certain probability only, a mathematically correct
approach is to base decisions on expected value (EV), that is, the
product of a good’s value and the probability of obtaining it.
Humans typically depart from this solution, and the science of
behavioral economics attempts to account for this. The most suc-
cessful account to date is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Prospect theory identifies
three ways in which observed choices typically deviate from those
dictated by expected value. First, following von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944), choices are based on utility, or the subjective
value of the good. Subjective value shows diminishing growth with
respect to objective value, producing the phenomenon of diminish-
ing marginal utility. Second, this utility function is asymmetrically
generated about a mathematically arbitrary but psychologically
salient anchor point. The anchor point is typically zero, the utility
function is typically steeper for outcomes less than zero, and this
gives rise to the phenomenon of loss aversion; namely, that losses
hurt more than equivalent gains please. Third, probabilities are
distorted at the decision stage, such that small probabilities are
inflated and large ones are diminished. It is the first two of the
distortions described above, those that reify the zero anchor point,
and are collectively known as the “value function,” that are the
subject of the current paper.
fMRI studies have identified a wide network of areas that
appear responsive to value, and there is growing evidence that some
of these may show a value function that is anchor point depend-
ent. Pine et al. (2009) found that blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) activation in the striatum, anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), and ventral tegmental area showed effects consistent with
diminishing marginal utility. Loss aversion has been studied by
Tom, Fox, Trepel, and Poldrack (2007) who found that the striatum
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex showed greater decreases in
activity following losses than increases following gains, and that
this effect correlated with individual behavioral differences in loss
aversion. Loss-aversion brain behavior correlates have also been
shown by de Martino, Kumaran, Holt, and Dolan (2009) and
Seymour, Daw, Dayan, Singer, and Dolan (2007), specifically in
the ventral striatum. In contrast, other studies have identified the
amygdala and insula as sources of loss aversion (e.g., de Martino,
Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Knutson et al., 2008; Weber et
al., 2007). The wider evidence for prospect theory effects in the
brain is reviewed in Trepel, Fox, and Poldrack (2005).
A quite different body of work on neural representation of value
concerns single cell recordings of midbrain dopamine neurons.
These show phasic dopamine increases with unexpected reward
and decreases with unexpected omission of reward (Bayer &
Glimcher, 2005; Bayer, Lau, & Glimcher, 2007; Hollerman &
Schultz, 1998; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). They thus
appear to code for the difference between expected and obtained
value. Such prediction errors, or temporal difference errors, are
known to be powerful tools in reinforcement learning (Sutton &
Barto, 1998), and so there is reason to predict their representation
in the brain.
It has been claimed by Holroyd and Coles (2002) that it is the
phasic activity of midbrain dopaminergic neurons that gives rise to
the electrophysiological (EEG) component known as feedback
negativity, or feedback-related negativity (FRN). This component
is characterized by a negative-going waveform at medial frontal
sites in the interval 200–300 ms when unfavorable feedback
is received. Holroyd and Coles argue that the FRN reflects the
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transmission of a prediction error from the midbrain dopamine
system to the ACC. As such, the amplitude of the FRN should be
determined by the size of the prediction error. In keeping with the
theory, subsequent research has shown that unexpected events
produce greater FRNs (Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Hajcak, Moser,
Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Potts, Martin,
Burton, & Montague, 2006; San Martin, Manes, Hurtado, Isla, &
Ibanez, 2010), as do outcomes of greater than expected magnitude
(Bellebaum, Polezzi, & Daum, 2010; Kreussel et al., 2012; Marco-
Pallares, Kramer, Strehl, Schroder, & Munte, 2010; Wu & Zhou,
2009, although see Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006;
Yeung & Sanfey, 2004).
Both the reinforcement learning theory of the FRN and prospect
theory describe valuation. An important difference is that prospect
theory describes valuation of outcomes prior to their resolution
while the FRN purportedly represents valuation after. However,
insofar as the FRN is believed to represent a prediction error, it
must formally incorporate (and therefore be sensitive to) the prior
valuation term. This is because prediction errors consist in the
difference between obtained value and EV, and EV is given by the
prior valuation of a prospective outcome (in conjunction with its
probability). This means the FRN amplitude can be used to retro-
spectively infer the prior valuation placed on prospects. For
example, if you flip a coin to either lose a dollar or lose nothing and
you wind up losing the dollar, this outcome constitutes a prediction
error of -$0.50. However, if your prior valuation of the loss of a
dollar was in fact -$2 (as claimed by prospect theory), then the
outcome constitutes a prediction error of -$1. Consequently, where
FRNs differ despite no difference in the objective value of predic-
tion errors, we can infer distorted prior valuation.
While the existence in the brain of a biased estimate of EV is
implied by the ubiquity of anchor point effects on behavior, it does
not follow that this is used in the generation of prediction errors.
The discussion of fMRI findings above suggests the possibility of
multiple representations of EV, and while anchor point effects are
certainly present at the generation of behavior, it is unclear at what
point they are introduced neurally. It might be relatively late, at the
point of deciding between alternative actions. Alternatively, anchor
point biases might be applied at the very outset of EV computation,
prior to any involvement of systems concerned with behavioral
output. Since, as noted above, the FRN should be sensitive to any
anchor point effects that are present in the EV term it uses to
construct prediction errors, it can be used to investigate when, in
the route from valuation to behavior, these anchor point effects are
applied. Because the FRN concerns evaluation of feedback, rather
than choice between actions, if it reveals anchor point effects, then
this suggests that these are widespread in the brain’s representation
of EV. If they are absent, it might suggest that they are introduced
later and closer to the point of action selection.
Behaviorally, anchor point effects have been demonstrated in
nonhuman primates (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006;
Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2011) and birds (Marsh &
Kacelnik, 2002), suggesting they may have an extracortical source.
However, to date, single cell studies have not been revealing.
Regarding diminishing marginal utility, Bayer and Glimcher
(2005) found a simple linear relationship between positive predic-
tion error and dopamine release, while others (e.g., Morris,
Arkadir, Nevet, Vaadia, & Bergman, 2004; Satoh, Nakai, Sato, &
Kimura, 2003) conclude that the relationship was monotonic.
There is no single cell work on loss aversion that we are aware of.
In the following experiments, participants undertook a number
of gambles that could lead to a good or a bad outcome with respect
to the gamble’s EV. The monetary difference between the good and
the bad outcome was held constant in each experiment. This was
important because it led to the null hypothesis that differences in
the feedback event-related potential (ERP) following good and bad
outcomes would remain constant regardless of other experimental
factors. This null hypothesis is based on the assumption that the
FRN uses an EV term that is unaffected by the zero anchor point
and thus codes obtained value and expected value objectively.
In Experiment 1, we manipulated the factor of domain, that is,
whether the sum gambled for was gained or lost from participants’
bankrolls. Gambles either occurred in the gain domain so that
participants won 10 units or won nothing, or they occurred in the loss
domain so that participants lost 10 units or lost nothing. The phe-
nomenon of loss aversion is thus a domain effect. While gambles in
the gain domain are clearly preferable to those in the loss domain,
the difference between the good and bad outcomes is the same in
both gambles, objectively speaking. Loss aversion, in contrast,
predicts that the perceived difference will be greater in the loss
domain. If this applies to the FRN, then a greater difference should
be seen between the waveforms for good and bad outcomes in the
loss (-10/0) domain gamble than the win (0/10) domain gamble.
In Experiment 2, we manipulated the factor of zero proximity,
that is, whether the sum gambled for lay close to or far from zero.
Gambles were either zero proximal such that participants won 10
units or nothing or they were zero distal such that participants won
100 units or 90. The phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility is
thus a zero-proximity effect. Gambles that are zero distal are
clearly preferable to those that are zero proximal; however, once
again, the difference between the good and bad outcomes is the
same in both gambles. Diminishing marginal utility predicts,
however, that the perceived difference will be greater for zero-
proximal gambles. If this applies to the FRN, then a greater differ-
ence should be seen between the waveforms for good and bad
outcomes in the zero-proximal (0/10) gamble than the zero-distal
(90/100) gamble. The generation of prospect theory effects from
the underlying value function is shown in Figure 1.
Regarding the zero-proximity manipulation, we know of no
FRN studies that have studied this. Regarding domain, Holroyd,
Larsen, and Cohen (2004) found no evidence of this effect when
gambles of equal stakes were offered either side of zero. However,
looking for loss aversion was not the object of their study, and these
authors blocked the gambles in the gain and loss domains sepa-
rately. Given the importance of framing effects in prospect theory
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), we would expect this to strongly
reduce or eliminate the salience of the zero anchor point and
attenuate loss aversion. Kreussel et al. (2012) recently made a
comparison of gambles in the loss and gain domains as part of a
wider study of the determinants of the FRN. These authors found
no effect of domain unless time (first vs. second half of the experi-
ment) was included as a factor, in which case FRN showed increas-
ingly greater sensitivity to gambles in the gain domain. This is an
intriguing result, contrary to prospect theory. Nevertheless, the
requirement of time as a mediating variable, and the fact that a
further two other variables were manipulated in Kreussel et al.’s
experiment, increasing the danger of component overlap and also
perhaps diminishing the salience of the zero point, suggests further
exploration is appropriate. In addition, we also report P300 ampli-
tudes since this component has been shown to be sensitive to the
determinants of EV (e.g., Wu & Zhou, 2009) and the stimulus-
preceding negativity (SPN), a slow negative wave that precedes
stimuli containing information and which is believed to be an index
of attention (Brunia & van Boxtel, 2012).
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Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Seventy-two undergraduates (3 left-handed, 10
male) participated for course credit and the opportunity to win a
small sum of money. Data from six participants were rejected
(three for equipment failure, two for artifacts on over 75% of trials,
one for blinking selectively in response to bad feedback).
Task. Since money gained and lost on the task was predetermined
to be zero, it was necessary to provide participants with a starting
bankroll to avoid the possibility of their having negative winnings
during the game. To encourage a sense of ownership of this money,
participants “won” it in a reaction time task unrelated to the main
experiment. While winnings were ostensibly related to reaction
times, all participants in fact won £2.90 (approximately $4.50).
The primary task was presented on a computer using E-Prime
software and is depicted in Figure 2. Participants were shown a
graphic depicting four squares, each containing a symbol. Two of the
squares were highlighted with a thick border. Participants were told
that on each occasion one of the highlighted symbols would be good
and the other bad. They selected one of the two available symbols
using keys corresponding to the icon’s position on the screen.
Prior to learning whether their choice was correct, participants
were instructed to choose which domain to play in, that is, “for a
win” or “to avoid loss.” This was accomplished with a graphic
showing these phrases either side of the screen. On the first of any
set of four trials, these phrases appeared in duplicate. Selecting an
option resulted in one fewer of the corresponding phrase appearing
on the next trial. When both copies of a phrase had disappeared,
choosing those stakes was not permissible. This ensured that in a
block of four trials participants played twice for a win and twice to
avoid loss in an order of their choosing. Participants were made to
actively choose the domain to increase the salience of this key
manipulation and to encourage its retention up to the point of
feedback. For the same reason, participants chose it after they
selected the symbol that ostensibly determined whether the
outcome would be good or bad.
An auditory confirmation of participants’ choice of domain
lasted 1,250 ms, immediately followed by a fixation cross pre-
sented for 500–600 ms. Feedback was then presented for 5 s in the
form of a pink or yellow circle, denoting whether the good or bad
symbol had been chosen (the color representing the good symbol
was counterbalanced across participants). The circle appeared in
the center of the screen against a white background and occupied
approximately 3° of visual angle horizontally and vertically.
Finally a summary window appeared for 1 s detailing that trial’s
winnings and money earned so far. “To win trials” resulted in a win
of £0.10 or nothing; “to avoid loss” trials resulted in a loss of £0.10
or nothing. Outcomes were pseudorandomly determined to be good
or bad half the time for each domain. The position of the four
symbols, which were highlighted, was randomly determined on
each trial. While only two symbols were necessary to implement
the experiment, extra symbols were used to obscure the random
nature of the task and to encourage the formation of strategies that
would lead to greater interest in feedback (Yeung, Holroyd, &
Cohen, 2005).
To check that participants were paying attention both to the
domain played in and the valence of the feedback, after approxi-
mately 10% of trials (randomly determined) they were prompted to
press a key to indicate what domain the preceding trial had been
played in and what its outcome had been. A 2-s time limit was
placed on each response. Participants’ bankrolls were increased or
decreased £0.10 for right or wrong answers. Total earnings for the
experiment averaged £4.62 per person.
Figure 1. a: The prospect theory value function is curved and is steeper for losses. b: A loss of 10 units has more subjective impact than a gain of 10 units
as shown by the double-headed arrows. c: A gain of 10 units over an initial nothing has greater subjective impact than a gain of 10 units over an initial 90.
d: A value function where there is no zero anchor point: direction and distance from zero have no effect on subjective value.
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Participants played through 192 trials in four blocks separated
by 30-s breaks. At the experiment’s conclusion, the satisfaction of
the participant with the various outcomes was measured. Partici-
pants were shown a graphic depicting a 25-cm line and told one end
represented “very unhappy” and the other “very happy.” They were
asked to position markers on the line to indicate how, on average,
the good and bad outcomes for each of the two domains had made
them feel. These were converted to numerical scores. The order
in which the markers were placed was counterbalanced across
participants.
EEG recording and analysis. EEG data were collected from 11
actively amplified Ag/AgCl electrodes (actiCAP, Brain Products,
Gilching, Germany) mounted on an elastic cap. The electrodes
were Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, F3, F4, FC3, FC4, FP1, FP2. Since the
primary focus of this study was the FRN, which is reliably maximal
at medial sites, the lateral sites were included merely to allow a
preliminary qualitative check that the component identified as the
FRN was not greater laterally than medially. Electrodes were ref-
erenced to the left mastoid and rereferenced offline to the average
of left and right mastoid activity. Vertical eye movement was moni-
tored by electrodes FP1 and FP2 and a right suborbital electrode,
and horizontal eye movement was monitored using an electrode on
the right external canthus. Electrode impedances were kept below
20 kW. EEGs were amplified using a BrainAmp amplifier (Brain
Products), continuously sampled at 500 Hz, and filtered offline
with a band-pass filter from 0.1 to 30 Hz. ERPs were computed by
averaging artifact-free EEGs (> 90% trials). EEGs were rejected if
FP1, FP2, or ocular electrodes showed a voltage change exceeding
100 mv/100 ms or if any midline site showed a voltage change
exceeding 20 mv/ms.
For the FRN and P300, EEGs were time-locked to 200 ms
before the onset of the feedback to 700 ms afterward, and then were
baseline-corrected using the period -100 to 0 ms. A problem that
has hampered FRN research is lack of consistency in how the
component is measured, which can result in the same waveform
producing markedly different measures of FRN amplitude depend-
ing on the measure. Each method has its relative merits, as dis-
cussed by Wu and Zhou (2009). To increase the robustness of our
conclusions and to facilitate comparison with the existing and
future literature we quantified the FRN using three representative
methods: (1) A peak-to-average-peak measure was found by locat-
ing three peaks of alternating polarity: a positive peak from 150 to
280 ms, a following negativity from 200 to 350 ms, and a following
positivity from 280 to 500 ms. FRN was calculated as the differ-
ence of the negative peak and the average of the adjacent positive
peaks. A peak-to-average-peak measure was preferred to a peak-
to-peak measure that used only the preceding positivity because
grand average waveforms revealed that bad outcomes were associ-
ated with a late positivity at ~425 ms that was not attributable to the
P300, which showed positivity for good outcomes. The same peak-
to-average-peak measure of the FRN was used by Gu et al. (2011),
Oliveira, McDonald and Goodman (2007) and Yeung and Sanfey
(2004), all of whom present waveforms in which a late positive
deflection is similarly associated with bad outcomes. (2) A mean
voltage measure was taken in the interval 200–300 ms. For this
measure, the data were high-pass filtered at 2 Hz in order to remove
slow wave activity associated with the P300 (Wu & Zhou, 2009).
(3) A difference wave measure was taken by finding the peak of the
difference wave of good and bad outcomes in the interval
200–300 ms.
The P300 was measured as the peak positivity in the interval
275–500 ms. For the SPN, EEGs were time-locked to 1,250 ms
prior to the onset of the feedback (500–600 ms following selection
of domain) and baseline-corrected using the period -1,250 to
-750 ms. SPN was measured as the mean voltage in the interval
-200 to 0 ms preceding feedback onset (Kotani et al., 2003). When
analyzing the data, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied
where appropriate.
Results
Behavioral results. The fact that feedback was pseudorandomly
assigned precludes meaningful behavioral analysis of the primary
Figure 2. Sequence of stimuli in Experiment 1. Participants chose a highlighted icon, selected a domain to play in, received audio confirmation of their
choice, fixated, received color-coded feedback on whether a good or bad outcome had been achieved, and were shown a summary of winnings so far.
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task. Performance on the randomly delivered probe questions
showed that participants’ attention was high (errors recalling
domain < 5%, outcome < 4%).
The affective ratings that participants gave at the end of the
experiment for the four outcomes are shown in Figure 3. A 2 ¥ 2
analysis of variance (ANOVA) using the factors of valence and
domain revealed greater happiness for good outcomes, F(1,65) =
441.67, p < .001, ηp2 87= . , for outcomes in the gain domain,
F(1,65) = 89.78, p < .001, ηp2 58= . , with an interaction between
these factors, F(1,65) = 9.48, p  .01, ηp2 13= . , that revealed the
valence effect to be stronger in the loss domain, as predicted by
prospect theory. Further pairwise t tests revealed that there were
significant differences (p < .05) between each of the individual
components of this interaction.
Electrophysiological results. Feedback-related ERP activity typi-
cally consists in a frontocentral FRN between 200 and ~300 ms
that is more negative for bad outcomes, and a parietal P300 from
~270 ms onwards that is more positive for good outcomes. The
bad–good outcome difference term should thus be negative for both
components, and this can be seen in both the ERP waveform and
topographical maps in Figure 4.
A one-way ANOVA testing the effect of midline electrode site
(Fz to Pz) on difference wave peak negativity in the interval 200–
300 ms revealed a significant effect of site, F(4,260) = 8.67,
p < .001, ηp2 12= . , with the difference wave peak greatest at FCz
(4.16 mv) and smallest at Pz (3.97 mv). Consequently, FCz was
chosen as the site at which the FRN was measured.
Figure 5 shows the waveforms elicited by good and bad out-
comes in the two domains. As described earlier, three FRN meas-
ures were employed. A peak-to-average-peak analysis revealed a
significant effect of outcome valence, with FRN greater for bad
outcomes, F(1,65) = 4.17, p < .05, ηp2 06= . , and an interaction
between valence and domain, F(1,65) = 8.19, p < .01, ηp2 11= . .
Simple effects analysis showed that the valence effect was present
in the gain domain, t(65) = 3.14, p < .01, but not the loss domain,
t(65) = .24, p > .05. Further pairwise t tests of this interaction
revealed that the only significant differences (p < .05) were as a
result of the FRN being significantly higher in the gain/bad condi-
tion than all other conditions. There was no main effect of domain,
F(1,65) = 2.05, p > .05.
A mean voltage measure of FRN revealed a similar pattern
of results: significantly greater FRN for bad outcomes,
F(1,65) = 43.45, p < .001, ηp2 40= . , and a significant interaction
between valence and domain, F(1,65) = 17.11, p < .001, ηp2 18= . .
However, simple effects analysis showed that the valence effect
was present for both gain, t(65) = 7.43, p < .001, and loss,
t(65) = 4.31, p < .001, domains. There was no main effect of
Figure 3. Participants’ happiness with each of the four possible
Domain ¥ Valence outcomes as measured by self-report at the end of the
experiment.
Figure 4. The effect of feedback valence (bad–good) in Experiment 1
shown as an ERP waveform (a) and a scalp topography (b).
Figure 5. FRN in Experiment 1. The figure shows grand average ERPs
following feedback on whether a good or bad outcome had been achieved
from a monetary gamble. Good outcomes are shown by light lines, bad
outcomes by dark lines. Gambles in the gain domain are shown by thick
lines, gambles in the loss domain by thin lines. Feedback is at 0 ms.
Electrode site is FCz.
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domain, F(1,65) = 3.41, p > .05. Further pairwise t tests revealed
that there were significant differences (p < .05) between each of the
individual components of this interaction with the exception of the
gain/bad and loss/bad comparison.
Figure 6 shows bad–good outcome difference waves for the two
domains. The difference wave peak in the gain domain was signifi-
cantly greater, t(65) = 3.12, p < .01, thus supporting the interaction
between domain and valence shown in the previous measures.
Following Kreussel et al. (2012), we examined the effect of
time by splitting the data into two halves. Three participants were
removed because trials fell below the recommended minimum
of 20 (Marco-Pallares, Cucurell, Munte, Strien, & Rodriguez-
Fornells, 2011). Using a peak-to-average-peak analysis, the three-
way Domain ¥ Valence ¥ Time interaction fell just short of
significance, F(1,62) = 3.36, p < .10. We explored this further by
checking whether the Valence ¥ Domain interaction shown previ-
ously was present in both halves of the experiment. There was no
interaction in the first half, F(1,62) = 1.26, p > .05, but a strong
interaction in the second, F(1,62) = 12.53, p < .001, ηp2 17= . .
Using a mean voltage measure, no significant Time ¥ Valence ¥
Domain interaction was found (F < 1).
A one-way ANOVA testing the effect of midline electrode site
(Fz to Pz) on the positivity of the waveform (all conditions aver-
aged) in the interval 275–500 ms revealed a significant effect of
site, F(4,260) = 8.67 p < .001, ηp2 12= . , with the peak positivity
greatest at Pz (10.52 mv) and smallest at Fz (7.40 mv). Conse-
quently, Pz was chosen as the site at which the P300 was measured.
The P300 is shown in Figure 7. An analysis of the P300 revealed
that its amplitude was significantly greater for good outcomes,
F(1,65) = 25.94, p < .001, ηp2 21= . , and for outcomes in the gain
domain, F(1,65) = 8.93, p < .01, ηp2 12= . , but there was no inter-
action between valence and domain, F < .01.
A one-way ANOVA testing the effect of midline electrode site
(Fz to Pz) on the mean negativity of the waveform (all conditions
averaged) in the interval -200 to 0 ms prefeedback revealed a
significant effect of site, F(4,260) = 16.34, p < .001, ηp2 20= . , with
greatest negativity at Cz (-7.48 mv) and least at Fz (-5.28 mv).
Consequently, Cz was chosen as the site at which the SPN was
measured. Results revealed that the SPN was significantly greater
preceding loss domain feedback, t(65) = 2.46, p < .05.
Discussion
The stated satisfaction of participants with outcomes showed
strong loss aversion, but there was no evidence of this in the FRN.
Instead, the reverse effect was found: increased sensitivity for
gains. The P300 was elevated for outcomes that were good and
for those in the gain domain. The SPN, an index of anticipatory
attention, was greater for loss domain gambles, in keeping with




Participants. Fifty-nine undergraduates (5 left-handed, 24 males)
participated for course credit and the opportunity to win a small
sum of money. No participants were subsequently rejected.
Task. The task was essentially similar in structure to Experiment 1
with the following differences. As domain and marginal utility
terms are orthogonal in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) math-
ematical realization of prospect theory, the gambles in this experi-
ment were presented in a single domain. The gain domain was
chosen as the effect of valence was found to be stronger in the gain
than the loss domain in Experiment 1, while also being the most
commonly studied domain within the literature. Since participants
could not incur negative winnings, the reaction time task from
Experiment 1 was omitted. In the main experimental task, in order
to provide winnings that were either close or far from the zero
anchor point, and at the same time keep participant payments
manageable, the game was played for points. On a given trial,
participants could earn 0, 10, 90, or 100 points. These were later
converted to cash at the rate of £0.01 per 25 points. All other events
on a trial resembled Experiment 1 except that instead of choosing
to play “to win” or “to avoid loss,” participants chose gambles that
were either close to or far from zero, namely, “nothing or ten” or
“ninety or a hundred.” These choices were displayed as “0/10” and
“90/100.” Total earnings for the experiment averaged £4.82 per
person.
Results
Behavioral results. Performance on the randomly delivered probe
questions showed that participants’ attention was high (errors
Figure 6. Difference waves created from waveforms shown in Figure 5.
The good outcome waveform is subtracted from the bad outcome waveform
for each domain separately.
Figure 7. P300 in Experiment 1. The figure shows grand average ERPs
following feedback on whether a good or bad outcome had been achieved
from a monetary gamble. Good outcomes are shown by light lines, bad
outcomes by dark lines. Gambles in the gain domain are shown by thick
lines, gambles in the loss domain by thin lines. Feedback is at 0 ms.
Electrode site is Pz.
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recalling zero proximity < 5%, outcome < 3%). The affective
ratings that participants gave at the end of the experiment for the
four outcomes are shown in Figure 8. To test for an effect of
diminishing marginal utility, a 2 ¥ 2 ANOVA of zero proximity and
outcome valence was performed. This revealed greater happiness
for good outcomes, F(1,58) = 341.52, p < .001, ηp2 86= . , for zero-
distal outcomes, F(1,58) = 131.85, p < .001, ηp2 69= . , and an inter-
action, F(1,58) = 13.21, p < .001, ηp2 19= . , such that the valence
effect was stronger for the zero-proximal outcomes than the zero-
distal ones, as predicted by prospect theory. Further examination
using pairwise t tests revealed that there were significant differ-
ences (p < .05) between each of the individual components of this
interaction with the exception of the zero-proximal/good versus the
zero-distal/bad outcome.
Electrophysiological results. Figure 9 shows bad–good outcome
voltage differences. It shows the same progression of FRN to P300
seen in Experiment 1. The site at which FRN was maximal (using
the negative peak of the difference wave at 200–300 ms) was estab-
lished using a one-way ANOVA using the five midline electrodes.
While this did not produce a significant effect of site, (F < 1), the
difference wave peak was greatest at FCz (4.14 mv) and smallest at
Pz (3.96), and thus FCz was chosen as the site at which the FRN
was measured.
Figure 10 shows the ERPs elicited by good and bad outcomes
for zero-proximal (0/10) and zero-distal (90/100) gambles. A
peak-to-average-peak analysis revealed a significant effect of
valence, with FRN greater for bad outcomes, F(1,58) = 9.21,
p < .01, ηp2 14= . . There was no effect of zero proximity, F < .1, nor
was there a significant interaction between zero proximity and
valence, F < .1 A mean voltage measure of FRN revealed the same
pattern of results: a significantly greater FRN for bad than good
outcomes, F(1,58) = 42.51, p < .001, ηp2 42= . , but no main effect
of zero proximity, F(1,58) = 2.54, p > .05, or interaction with
valence, F < .1. Figure 11 shows bad–good outcome difference
waves, with the peak of difference wave measure of FRN in agree-
ment with the previous analyses in showing no effect of zero
proximity, t < 1.
A one-way ANOVA testing the effect of midline electrode site
(Fz to Pz) on the positivity of the waveform (all conditions aver-
aged) in the interval 275–500 ms revealed a significant effect of
site, F(4,232) = 34.49, p < .001, ηp2 37= . , with the peak positivity
greatest at Pz (8.72 mv) and smallest at Fz (5.32 mv). Consequently,
Pz was chosen as the site at which the P300 was measured. An
analysis of the P300, shown in Figure 12, revealed that the ampli-
tude of this component was significantly greater for good out-
comes, F(1,58) = 18.12, p < .001, ηp2 24= . , but that there was no
effect of zero proximity, F < 1, or interaction with valence, F < 1.
A one-way ANOVA testing the effect of midline electrode site
(Fz to Pz) on the mean negativity of the waveform (all conditions
Figure 8. Participants’ happiness with each of the four possible
Zero-Proximity ¥ Valence outcomes as measured by self-report at the end
of the experiment.
Figure 9. The effect of feedback valence (bad–good) in Experiment 2
shown as an ERP waveform (a) and a scalp topography (b).
Figure 10. FRN in Experiment 2. The figure shows grand average ERPs
following feedback on whether a good or bad outcome had been achieved
from a monetary gamble. Good outcomes are shown by light lines, bad
outcomes by dark lines. Zero-proximal gambles are shown by thick lines,
zero-distal gambles by thin lines. Feedback is at 0 ms. Electrode site is FCz.
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averaged) in the interval -200 to 0 ms prefeedback revealed a
significant effect of site, F(4,232) = 10.09, p < .001, ηp2 15= . , with
greatest negativity at Cz (-6.03 mv) and least at Pz (-4.74 mv).
Consequently, Cz was chosen as the site at which the SPN was
measured. The SPN showed no significant difference between
zero-proximal and zero-distal gambles, t < 1.
Discussion
As with Experiment 1, participants’ stated satisfaction with out-
comes followed prospect theory, showing greater sensitivity to
zero-proximal outcomes. However, no such effect was observed in
the FRN, which was merely responsive to outcome valence. The
P300 was likewise sensitive only to valence. There was no effect of
zero proximity on the SPN.
General Discussion
Encoding of value is believed to start at the midbrain. It finds its
final expression in behavior and conscious appraisal. At some point
in this process, people typically succumb to two anchor point–
dependent biases in value coding, sensitivity to the domain (win or
loss), and sensitivity to zero proximity (zero proximal or zero
distal). When people make judgments of the value of prospects,
that is, of their expected value, they appear to make them with
respect to these biased values.
The rationale of the experiments presented here was to see if
these biases of expected value were used in the generation of the
FRN. The FRN is believed to represent a prediction error, that is, a
comparison of obtained value with EV. If the EV term used in the
generation of the FRN showed anchor point effects, this would
suggest that these were an integral feature of valuation in the brain,
not a bias introduced only at the point at which behavior was
implemented.
The biases, evident in participants’ affective ratings, were not
present in the FRN, suggesting anchor point effects may not be
integral to EV representation. Our data on diminishing marginal
utility in Experiment 2 are consistent with Bayer and Glimcher’s
(2005) demonstration of a linear coding of prediction error mag-
nitude in single dopamine cells (at least for positive errors). Our
confidence in this null result is bolstered by the large sample size
and the fact that essentially the same procedure was capable of
eliciting an effect in Experiment 1. A post hoc power estimate can
be usefully applied here. In Experiment 1, the observed power of
the design in finding the significant interaction between domain
and valence with an effect size of ηp2 11= . was .85. While Experi-
ment 2 had very slightly fewer participants, the close design simi-
larities suggest a similar power value, but in this case the
interaction between valence and zero proximity produced a p value
of .8, and so we are reasonably confident that these factors do not
interact.
In Experiment 1, in contrast to loss aversion, participants’ FRNs
showed greater sensitivity to gains. There is, to our knowledge, no
single cell study of domain effect to which we can compare this
result. However, since the FRN is believed to arise when midbrain
prediction errors reach either the cortex (Holroyd & Coles, 2002)
or the basal ganglia (see below), it would be unwise to assume that
this observed gain sensitivity is necessarily present in midbrain
coding. Rather, it may arise from modulation of an initially unbi-
ased midbrain prediction signal. In either event, however, this study
suggests a value function for the FRN that is quite different from
the one proposed by prospect theory as shown in Figure 1a. While
a graded, parametric manipulation of the factors of domain and
zero proximity is ultimately required to map the FRN value func-
tion, evidence from this study provisionally suggests a linear rather
than curved function (Experiment 2), which is steeper for gambles
in the gain domain than in the loss domain (Experiment 1).
An alternative explanation for the observed Domain ¥ Valence
interaction in Experiment 1 might arise from the fact that the
gain/good outcome is dissimilar to the other three outcomes in that
there is no aspect of that outcome which is negative. It might
thus constitute a qualitatively different outcome that drives the
interaction and supposed greater sensitivity to gains. However,
t tests revealed that the gain/good outcome was not an outlier.
Under a mean voltage measure of the FRN, both the gain/good
and gain/bad outcomes showed significant differences from other
conditions, while under a peak-to-average-peak measure, it was
the gain/bad condition that was an outlier compared to the other
conditions.
In order to integrate our findings with the existing fMRI litera-
ture on prospect theory effects, it is necessary to consider the neural
generator of the FRN. The ACC has traditionally been believed to
be the source of the FRN. However, recent evidence has suggested
that at least some portion of the FRN may arise in the striatum.
Using both fMRI and ERPs, Carlson, Foti, Mujica-Parodi,
Harmon-Jones, and Hajcak (2011) found that FRN correlated with
Figure 11. Difference waves created from waveforms shown in Figure 10.
The good outcome waveform is subtracted from the bad outcome waveform
for the zero-proximal and zero-distal gambles separately.
Figure 12. P300 in Experiment 2. The figure shows grand average ERPs
following feedback on whether a good or bad outcome had been achieved
from a monetary gamble. Good outcomes are shown by light lines, bad
outcomes by dark. Zero-proximal gambles are shown by thick lines,
zero-distal gambles by thin lines. Feedback is at 0 ms. Electrode site is Pz.
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BOLD activation in the ventral striatum, dorsal striatum, and
medial prefrontal cortex. However, principal components analysis
made in that study and another conducted by Foti, Weinberg, Dien,
and Hajcak (2011b) identified the dorsal striatum as the most prob-
able generator of the FRN. This was in agreement with the conclu-
sions of Martin, Potts, Burton, and Montague (2009). The issue
remains unresolved (Cohen, Cavanagh, & Slagter, 2011; Foti,
Weinberg, Dien, & Hajcak, 2011a); however, the frequency with
which the striatum is found to be activated by both rewards and
nonrewards (see Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011, for a meta-
analysis) justifies its consideration as a contributor to the FRN and
raises some possibilities, which we consider below.
Our domain effect stands in direct contrast to the finding of Tom
et al.’s (2007) fMRI study. This showed that the striatum responded
to outcomes in both gain and loss domains but with increased
sensitivity in the loss domain. These authors suggested that the
striatum was a source of value coding with an inbuilt loss aversion
parameter. Others have proposed a more componential basis for
value coding. For example, both Yacubian et al. (2006) and
Knutson, Adams, Fong, and Hommer (2001) found the ventral
striatum to be responsive only to gains, while losses and loss
aversion were associated with activity in the amygdala (de Martino
et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2007; Yacubian et al., 2006) or insula
(Knutson et al., 2008).
A resolution of these conflicting findings that would also be
consistent with those of the present study concerns the differential
roles that might be played by dopamine and serotonin. Opponency
between dopamine and serotonin is well established (e.g., Daw,
Kakade, & Dayan, 2002). In the striatum, there is evidence of a
serotonin-dopamine gradient along a caudal-rostral axis (Brown &
Molliver, 2000; Heidbreder, Hedou, & Feldon, 1999). Intriguingly,
Seymour et al. (2007) found that, within the striatum, anterior
regions showed relative selectivity for rewards, and posterior
regions for losses. This accords with a number of recent studies,
which have suggested that these two neuromodulators contribute
differentially to coding for outcomes less than or greater than the
zero anchor point. For example, Zhong et al. (2009) have shown
that genetic variation in tonic dopamine and serotonin levels modi-
fies risk seeking in gain and loss domains, respectively. Pessigli-
one, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, and Frith (2006) showed that
dopamine agonists affected choices in the gain domain (both neu-
rally and behaviorally) but not the loss domain. Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al. (2011) showed that serotonin but not dopamine
promoted “chasing behavior,” that is, gambles undertaken by par-
ticipants who consider themselves to currently hold assets below an
anchor point (typically what they started a session with).
Given that gambling is a recent, purely cultural phenomenon, it
may initially seem implausible to suggest differential action of
neuromodulators for gambles either side of the zero anchor point.
It appears more credible, however, when one considers that the
anchor point effectively frames all outcomes below it as a form of
punishment and all outcomes above it as a form of reward. Thus,
gambling may be rather easily mapped onto a much older func-
tional division. Consequently, it is possible that gambles with an
EV higher than zero might harness a dopaminergic system devoted
to detecting rewarding/appetitive outcomes (and their omission),
and gambles with negative EV might harness a serotoninergic
system devoted to detecting punishment/aversive outcomes (and
their avoidance). There is no evidence of serotoninergic neurons
carrying reward prediction error signals in the form described by
Schultz et al. (1997) for dopamine neurons. However, a midbrain
dopaminergic prediction error signal arriving at the striatum might
well selectively trigger serotoninergic activity to the extent to
which the gamble’s prior EV was seen to belong to the loss or
punishment domain (while prediction errors in the gain domain
would remain dopamine transmitted).
Accordingly, given that the FRN is believed to reflect a
dopaminergic signal, we should not be surprised to see it show
greater sensitivity to the gain domain. Both Kreussel et al. (2012)
and our own experiment showed no significant difference in the
FRN for good and bad outcomes in the loss domain. Nevertheless,
the bad outcomes in both studies produced more negative FRNs
than the good, and other studies (e.g., Crowley, Wu, Bailey, &
Mayes, 2009; Holroyd et al., 2004) have suggested the FRN dis-
criminates good and bad outcomes in the loss domain, implying
that the differential effect of the domains on the FRN is a matter of
degree. This might be due to there being only a partial separation of
dopamine and serotonin coding function in gain and loss domains,
or because an FRN is generated by serotoninergic activity at the
striatum but its more caudal source results in a reduced potential at
the scalp.
We also measured the P300, a component believed to be broadly
sensitive to the informational content of a stimulus. While it might
be expected that the P300 would be greater in the loss domain, as
a result of loss aversion, we found that gain domain gambles
elicited a larger P300. This accords with Kreussel et al.’s (2012)
results (although the P300 fell just short of significance in their
study). The P300 is assumed to respond to task-relevant informa-
tion (e.g., Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005), and so this
component may tell us something about how participants perceived
the task they were engaged in. If so, participants appear to have
perceived gambles in the gain domain as more relevant to the task
at hand than those in the loss domain. Note that while net earnings
in Experiment 1 were predetermined to be zero, participants’ bank-
rolls increased over time due to the bonus money received from
correctly answering probe questions. Once an upward trajectory
began to be accepted as the norm, participants may have come to
perceive their task as maximizing the speed with which they
increased their bankroll, and while loss domain gambles are logi-
cally as relevant as gain domain gambles to this task, participants
may not have perceived them as such. Kreussel et al. (2012) sug-
gested that this asymmetry of perceived task relevance of the two
domains could in fact underlie the FRN sensitivity to gains in their
study, which was only observable when (growth over) time was
added as an extra variable. In the current experiment, the support
for this time-based interpretation of the domain effect was not
strong insofar as the three-way Time ¥ Domain ¥ Valence interac-
tion was present for only one of the three methods of quantifying
the FRN. Furthermore, evidence against Kreussel et al.’s interpre-
tation comes from the SPN. This component is assumed to reflect
anticipatory attention (van Boxtel & Bocker, 2004). In our data, the
SPN for loss gambles was greater than that for gain gambles,
suggesting that participants were more sensitive to prospective
losses, in keeping with their later affective ratings. This contrasted
with their FRNs, where there was greater sensitivity for gain
gambles, as indicated by the greater valence effect in that domain.
We therefore do not regard participants’ perception of the task as
the basis of the domain effect found in the FRN.
The experiments described in this study revealed a discrepancy
between the FRN and subsequent affective ratings. Participants’
affective ratings were sensitive both to outcome value relative to
EV and the absolute value of the outcome. Sensitivity to absolute
value was shown by an overall preference for gain domain gambles
and for zero-distal gambles, both of which gave the better monetary
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return on average. Sensitivity to outcome value relative to EV was
shown by good outcomes being preferred to bad. These simultane-
ous effects are nicely demonstrated by participants’ ratings of zero-
proximal/good and zero-distal/bad conditions in Experiment 2. The
zero-distal/bad outcome was bad compared to its alternative yet
returned a higher absolute gain than the zero/proximal good
outcome. The sum effect of these dual considerations on partici-
pants’ happiness appears to be that these two outcomes were rated
equally pleasant. At a conscious, reflective level, participants thus
appear to rate outcomes using both absolute value and EV. These
very strong main effects in both experiments were modulated by
significant but weaker interactions consistent with prospect theory.
The FRN was very different. The valence main effect was
strong, showing that a comparison with EV was made (reflecting
the orthodoxy of Holroyd and Coles’ 2002 theory), but the marked
main effects of domain and zero proximity that were present in the
affective ratings were entirely absent. The FRN does not therefore
appear to directly compute absolute outcome value, a finding also
shown by Holroyd et al. (2004). Domain did have an effect in the
form of an interaction with valence, but this cannot be explained as
a direct comparison of the outcome relative to the zero anchor
point. First, this should produce a main effect of domain. Further-
more, if this were the case, the observed interaction would have to
be driven by one of the outcomes that differed from the zero point,
that is, by the gain/good (win 10) or lose/bad (lose 10) outcomes. In
fact, when measured by a peak-to-average-peak measure, the
Domain ¥ Valence interaction was driven by the gain/bad (win 0)
outcome showing a large FRN, while under a mean voltage
measure both a large FRN for gain/bad outcomes and a small FRN
for gain/good outcomes contributed to the Domain ¥ Valence inter-
action. As such, the domain effect in the FRN data is best described
by an overall increased sensitivity to prediction errors in the gain
domain rather than a direct assessment of the outcome relative to
zero.
Affective ratings are rarely taken in FRN research; however,
Hajcak et al. (2006), Moser and Simons (2009), San Martin et al.
(2010), and Yeung and Sanfey (2004) have shown consistency
between FRNs and subsequent affective ratings. In contrast, Toyo-
maki and Murohashi (2005) reported that differences in stated
satisfaction with outcomes were not always reflected in partici-
pants’ FRNs. However, satisfaction was described in purely anec-
dotal terms in that study. Here, we have quantitatively shown
dissociation between a component that putatively measures the
hedonic impact of a stimulus at time of delivery and subsequent
affective ratings of that stimulus. This may be problematic for
claims that the FRN reflects the motivational significance of out-
comes (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Luu, Tucker, Derry-
berry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003) or constitutes a somatic marker
(Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003).
In summary, the generation of anchor point–dependent value
judgments in the brain appears to be complex. The existing fMRI
literature has not yet resolved where these occur. We present the
first ERP experiment that explicitly attempts to study the two
anchor point effects described by prospect theory. It is always
difficult to integrate ERP and fMRI findings owing to the tech-
niques’ differential resolution in the spatial and temporal domains.
However, our findings support the view that value coding in the
brain is componential, with different structures, and possibly neu-
romodulators, showing varying sensitivity to the zero anchor point.
We reach this conclusion because the behavioral effect of loss
aversion, described by prospect theory and behaviorally evident in
this experiment, was preceded by an electrophysiological compo-
nent known to be sensitive to value, which was more sensitive to
gains than losses.
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